p r e v a i l i n g belief in H ungarian so ciety is th at through the decentral ization scheme for the centrally planned economy introduced in 1968, most ob stacles to the growth of industrial effi ciency can be overcome, directly or in directly, by differential money incen tives. For the past three years a p art of company profits has been used for dif ferential incentive bonuses: up to 80 percent of salary for top m anagem ent, 50 percent for m iddle managers, and 15 percent for wage earners. T his con siderable share in profits has seemed to be a driving force for m anagem ent; m an agers have made m anifold attem pts to increase efficiency and profits in their companies. However, they usually have failed in their efforts to get workers to W orker p ro ductivity can n o t be im proved sim ply by in tro d u cin g a system of m oney in centives. P ro d u ctio n difficulties have th e ir o ri gins in the divergent interests a n d powers of various groups w ith in the w ork establishm ent and req u ire com plex m odifications of the social and econom ic environm ent for th e ir solution. T h is study of a H u n g a rian factory p o in ts u p the need to identify the various groups of participants, the conditions u n d e r w hich they are m otivated to produce, a n d the processes by which m ultip le centers of interests and pow er develop. It concludes th a t resolution of socio economic conflicts is essential to achieving sat isfactory work perform ance.
Lajos H £thy a n d Casba Mak<J are m em bers of the In stitu te of Sociology, H u n g a rian A cad em y of Sciences.-E d i t o r m ake a greater contribution to company objectives; obstacles to the growth of efficiency have continued to exist on the shop floor.
As a general rule, labor has rejected com pany goals; there has rem ained a constant gap between the targets set by m anagem ent and the day-to-day perfor mance of employees. Lack of sympathy w ith m anagem ent's objectives has been m anifest in many ways: workers have resisted attem pts to m aintain strict dis cipline, they have deliberately restricted output, they have perform ed work of poor quality, and so forth. Many m an agers and economic leaders believe that this discrepancy between company goals and labor's behavior can be attributed to inadequacies in money incentives, that is, to the lack of fair wage differentials am ong workers.
O ur proposition is that the causal re lations are not so unam biguous and simple: inadequacies in wage incentives, although closely connected with difficul ties in the workshops, cannot be a basic cause of discipline problem s and restric tion of output, b u t themselves are also a symptom. T h e underlying cause of the difficulties, including the lack of fair wage differentials, lies in the structure of interests and powers w ithin the or ganization and is based on certain micro and macro factors in the social and eco nom ic environm ent. These factors origi nate from the present regulations set up by social and economic central agen cies and from the characteristics of the overall socioeconomic system of industry which has come into existence as a result of developments of the past few decades.
T o place o u r proposition in a sharper focus: production difficulties in work shops cannot be solved solely by revision of the incentive system. T h e solution of these problems, including the introduc tion of efficient wage differentials, re quires complex changes in the structure of interests and power w ithin the enter prise, that is, complex modifications in the social and economic environm ent.
T he Company, Its Workers, and
Shop-Floor Problems O ur proposition is supported by the results of a sociological survey carried out in an engineering factory in western Hungary. T h e company to be discussed plays an im portant role in the economic activity of the country. It m anufactures railway coaches, tank wagons, differential gears, axles, steering gears, and chassis for trucks and buses-mostly for export. It also has started production of heavyduty Diesel engines under license from a West Germ an firm. In its different units the company employs a total of about fifteen thousand production work ers.
T h e u n it in which the survey took place m anufactures bodies for railway coaches. Its employees, about two h u n dred sheet-metal workers and welders, work in groups organized by the nature of their tasks. T h e work groups are paid on the basis of how m uch they produce, according to a straight piece-rate system. As a g roup's productivity increases, its earnings also rise; and conversely, as o u tp u t falls, there is a corresponding drop in earnings. W ithin the group, earnings are not divided equally b u t on the basis of the personal wage rates of the members. T h e wage plan thus is de signed to function as a group incentive and as an individual incentive at the same time. T h e activities of the groups are directed by nine foremen and two senior foremen.
T h e m anagem ent of the company was not satisfied w ith discipline and work intensity in the railway coach unit, as individual workers and even groups often restricted o u tp u t and had high turnover rates, thus endangering the continuity of production. For this rea son, m anagem ent revised the wage plan in 1968. T h e revision was based on a widespread belief th at setting proper wage differentials would provide the solution to production problem s.1
T h e wage plan, as a group incentive, seemed to be satisfactory. As an indi vidual incentive, however, it seemed to be unresponsive to m anagem ent's efforts to enlarge the quantity of output. Per sonal wage rates, which regulated the relations of individual earnings within the group, had been set according to a central service and m erit-rating system. T h e favorite factors of the system, length of service in the company and profes sional qualification, were irrelevant to individual output, since neither long ex perience nor high-skill qualification were needed in the highly roudnized work in the plant. T hus, the system of personal wage rates had two m ajor deficiencies: (1) wages did not properly reflect indi JA system of differential incentive bonuses was in tro d u c ed in H u ngary in 1968 as a n a tional scheme. I t was p a rt of a series of eco nom ic reform s in te n d e d to produce a decentral ized and m ore flexible in d u stria l structure, w ith increased em phasis on m arket requirem ents and efficiency.
vidual effort and yielded different earn ings to workers of equal performance; and (2) the scale of individual wage differentials, originating from the rates, did not reflect possible differences in individual output, because it was too narrow.
T o correct these inadequacies, m an agement abolished the central service and m erit-rating system and authorized the foremen and the work groups, as the persons having the most accurate inform ation about the efforts of indi viduals, to set new personal wage rates. T he new rates set by the forem en and workers were, however, even less respon sive to m anagem ent's objectives than the previous ones. Individual wage inequi ties continued to exist, and the range of individual wage differentials became even narrower.2
In the course of o ur survey, we ex am ined the em pirical and logical con nections among the level and scale of individual wage differentials approved by the employees, the structure of inter ests and powers w ithin the organization, and the socioeconomic environm ent. O ur survey endeavored to cover all the im portant factors m otivating the be havior of workers and foremen. T h e in form ation needed came from th r e e sources: (1) structured interviews with each worker in the unit, with the help of a substantial questionnaire; (2) u n structured interviews with the m ajority of workers, with the foremen, and with representatives of top m anagem ent; and (3) data in the records of the company.
Need for Labor-Management
Cooperation T h e long-run economic success of a business organization requires coopera 2T h e coefficient of v a riation of the original scale was 0.13, th a t of th e revised scale 0.10. tion between the two m ajor participants in production, m anagers and workers, and the form ation of company goals ac ceptable to both. Cooperation and work ing out common goals can be based only on the solution of conflict situations pro duced by divergencies in the interests of m anagem ent and labor and on the ex istence of compromise situations, in which the two m ajor participants have a relatively good bargain in comparison with their contributions to the success of the organization. Compromise, how ever, does not develop autom atically from conflicts; a certain balance of pow er and influence is necessary between m anagem ent and labor to advance the process.
In the case of the company examined, cooperation between m anagers and work ers was not satisfactory. T h e employees rejected the goals which the employers had prescribed for them. Conflict situa tions seemed to be lasting, and the equilibrium of opposing powers ap peared to be upset.
On the assum ption that the structure of interests and powers is determ ined by the social and economic environm ent, we exam ined all factors which m ight have a direct or indirect effect on the interests, goals, influence, and behavior of people w ithin the framework of the organization. As the company is part of a centrally planned economy, we paid special attention to regulations by the central agencies.
Divergence in Management and Worker Goals
T h e clashes between the interests of m anagem ent and labor focused on wages and output. M anagem ent, stim ulated by its considerable share in profits, using prices in the international m arket as a guide, tried to choose a profit-maximiz IN D U STR IA L AND LABOR R ELA TIO N S R EV IEW ing bundle in its production-possibility set. (Plant managers have had rem ark able freedom in such decisions since the introduction of decentralization in 1968.) T h e decision was m ade to w ithdraw from m anufacture of railway coaches and u n dertake production of heavy-duty Diesel engines for buses and trucks. T h e com pany's an tiq u ated technology for railway coach m anufacture m ade the operation unprofitable, and state subsidies were being withdraw n. In addition, dem and for coaches is lim ited and several other companies produce them under more favorable circumstances. However, im m ediate cessation of production was not possible; withdraw al was to take the form of a gradual reduction of produc tion. Accordingly, m anagem ent felt that cuts in production costs were necessary. Since investm ent in new equipm ent or processes was not indicated under the circumstances, m anagem ent decided to cut labor costs by decreasing wages per u n it of output.
Labor, as its share in profits was low, was m otivated by wages. W orkers were ready to make extra efforts for extra pay and aimed their activities at m axi mizing earnings. T h e employees in the workshops, mostly of agricultural origin, were hard-working people, in whose thinking wages were fundam ental in re lation to their families' living standards and also as a m easure of their im portance in relation to others in and out of the factory. T h e workers, conse quently, opposed the m anagers' goals, regarding them as directed at "sweating" labor simply to "fill the company cof fers."
Central W age Regulations
Responsibility for the divergence of m anagem ent and labor interests cannot be fixed, however, entirely on the profitsharing system, on the high level of pro duction costs, on backward technology, or on the w ithdraw al of governmental subsidies. A prom inent part was played in the continuing confrontation by the control of central agencies over the level of wages. T h e central regulations pegged wages per capita on a roughly equal level in all engineering companies owned by the state. Any increase had to be covered from the share of profits to be divided am ong the participants in pro duction, a sum th at was considerable in relation to the salaries of managers but extremely small in relation to the total am ount of wages of employees. Thus the m anagem ent made attem pts to cut wages per u n it of o u tp u t and at the same time to keep wages per capita u n changed; it required extra effort from its employees w ithout being willing or, in fact, capable of giving them extra re ward.3
Only on the basis of the conditions of the company and the specified rules the m anagem ent was obligated to follow, can we understand the contradictory features of its incentive policies. M an agement pressed the work groups for in creased production and, to this end, em ployed an efficient group incentive, a piece-rate system w ithout (at least, theo retically) any ceiling on earnings. It promised extra rew ard for extra output. Moreover, as we have noted, manage m ent also made attem pts to improve in 3T h e control of central agencies over wages was in te n d e d to avoid certain undesirable ef fects of the econom ic reform . T o ta l freedom of m anagers, m o tivated by th e ir share in profits, to regulate wages m ig h t have led to rapidly grow ing earnings for some workers, w hile caus ing u n em ploym ent for others, a n d /o r to a high rate of inflation a n d d isequilibrium of supply a n d dem and in the m arket for consum er goods. Such a process w ould have been followed by sh arp a n d open social conflicts instead of the concealed ones described in this article. T h e indexes represent the averages of evaluations given by a b o u t tw o h u n d re d w orkers. A score of 3.0 m eans a high possibility, w hile a score of 1.0 m eans no possibility. dividual incentives by revising the ser vice and m erit-rating system. B ut when work-group productivity and earnings rose appreciably, it arbitrarily reset piece rates, also cutting wages per capita and pegging them to the level perm itted by the central agencies. In 1969, piece rates were cut twice, resulting in a 20 percent loss for labor in wages.4
Worker Perceptions of Their Jobs
Labor-m anagem ent conflicts over the level of wages were of the utm ost gravity, as wages held a top place in each work er's evaluation of his job. W orkers told us: "W e do not come here to produce railway carriages, b u t to earn a living." T h e reasons for the money-centered at titude of labor can be found partly in the present level of living in the country and partly in aspects of the environm ent which hinder the satisfaction of higher-4T h e regulations of the central agencies do not necessarily call in to existence such m a n agem ent policies. In several en gineering com panies, poor standards, p oor scheduling of jobs, insufficiencies in the supply of m aterial a n d in the m aintenance of tools a uto m atically prevent m anagem ent from b u ild in g u p w orkable incen tive systems. M anagem ents in o th e r firms, e n joying large subsidies a n d favorable in te rn a l m arket conditions set by the central agencies, n atu rally refrain from p ushing workers to in creased effort. In all these cases, a tacit agree m ent is forced on lab o r by m anagem ent; m a n agem ent does not offer ex tra pay a n d does n o t require ex tra work either. level needs of individuals w ithin the fac tory. W orking people were frustrated by the m onotony of their routinized jobs, by their inability to advance pro fessionally, by the pressures to which they were subject as they tried to do work of quality instead of quantity, and by their inability to achieve a measure of respect and autonom y in their every day activities.
T able 1 presents a summary of worker responses to a questionnaire asking them to indicate the extent to which they felt the actual work situation offered possi bilities for self-improvement and selfexpression. If a worker felt his job offered very good opportunity for learn ing new ideas or skills, his response was scaled at 3.0. If he felt it offered no possibility for learning new things, his response was m arked 1.0. T h e "desired situation" represents the aspirations of the respondents, that is, the extent to which they would like to have oppor tunities for learning, using their own ideas, doing interesting tasks, or using their professional knowledge.
T h e workers had practically no chance for prom otion to the positions of fore m an and senior foreman, posts usually w ithin the limits of workers' career struc ture. O n the one hand, in the u n it to be shut down the num ber of such posi tions gradually was decreasing; on the T h e indexes represent the averages of evaluations given by a b o u t tw o h u n d re d w orkers. A score of 3.0 m eans a significant role, w hile 1.0 m eans a n insignificant one.
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other hand, prom otion in the company was based in large part on factors u n related to skill or experience such as inform al links to m anagem ent, party membership, and trade union activities. W orkers' perceptions of the role played in prom otion by various factors as com pared to the im portance they felt should be given these factors are presented in T ab le 2. Because of lack of satisfaction of their higher-level needs, w o rk e rs sought com pensation in money.
Role of the Union
T h e series of m anagem ent victories and labor defeats, good bargains on one side and poor bargains on the other, resulted in a lasting confrontation, the existence of which reflected a lack of equilibrium in power, an im balance of opposing forces at the company. T he m anagem ent wielded an overwhelming power which the trade union, destined to defend the interests of labor, was in capable or unw illing to counterbalance. Incentive policies at the company, in cluding the continual cuts in piece rates, were approved by the executive of the trade union. T h e union, a heritage of a previous period, united in its ranks all sorts of members of the business organi zation, from unskilled workers to top managers. Several trade union positions were occupied by foremen, m iddle m an agers, and even top managers. T h e u n io n 's executive had a considerable share in company profits. In fact, top union leaders and top company m an agers, despite occasional spectacular con frontations, seemed to the workers to be a m onolithic group.
A lthough labor's rights to take part in company affairs, including decisions about the wage plan and prom otion, were guaranteed, workers had no means to im plem ent them. T h e functioning of the institution of workers' direct partici pation in m anagem ent decisions relevant to their interests proved to be profoundly formal. T h e dom inant push from labor m ight have come through the inform al organization of workers, which some times had substantial powers rival to those of m anagem ent, bu t in most cases this inform al organization was weak.
It has been suggested that the core conflict is between m anagem ent and la bor and arises from certain micro and m acro economic and social factors, cre ated by the present regulations of the central agencies and by the realities of the socioeconomic progress of past dec ades. O n the assumption, however, that people generally act under the influence of their environm ent, it seems obvious that neither company managers nor fac tory workers are homogeneous social units. Both are divided into several strata representing divergent i n t e r e s t s a n d goals. T hus the next step of our study was to scrutinize the intram anagem ent and intralabor structures of interests and powers, which affect harm ony w ithin the company.
The Structure of Management
W ithin managem ent, the foremen and other lower-level supervisors formed a separate stratum , w ith objectives often contradicting the interests of top m an agers. These "m en in the m iddle" had substantial power to influence the pro duction and wages of work groups. T h e functional departm ents of m anagem ent were incapable of controlling production problems, including supply of m aterial and m aintenance, and their solution was up to the foremen. (This situation originated in the prim itive level of tech nology, characteristic of the small fac tories of the past.) B ut top managers, believing in the efficiency of centraliza tion within the company, did not take into consideration the influence of the foremen. Accordingly, nothing had been done to insure their cooperation. Fore men received salaries inferior to those of the best-paid workers, and this state of affairs rem ained unchanged regard less of their special efforts or negligence. As a result, m anagem ent policies were a m atter of indifference to foremen. They neither aided n or hindered the success of m anagem ent's attem pts to encourage work group and individual outp u t but restricted their activities to the perfor mance of routine tasks. T h eir substantial powers rem ained largely potential, and their role in the discussions between top m anagem ent and labor was of m inor importance.
Separate Strata in Labor
Labor was also divided into separate strata. Each worker considered m anage m ent's incentive policies hostile to his interests and protested efforts to cut la bor costs. W orkers' devotion to money was general. However, personal wage rates, seniority w ith the organization, professional skills, household expenses, structure of consum ption, traditions, and other factors produced a com partm entalization w ithin the labor group sim ilar to that which occurred at m anagem ent level. T here were two m ajor factors re sponsible for the division of workers in to strata w ith divergent interests and various powers.
1. T h e current level and the future prospect of the individual's earnings, that is, his actual and expected economic position in the organization. B oth were dependent on wages per capita in the work group to which the individual be longed and on his personal wage rate. As wages per capita were pegged by the company on roughly the same level in all the groups, differences in the actual and expected economic positions could be caused only by personal wage rates. T hese rates, set prim arily on the basis of length of service in the company or job experience, moved rapidly upw ard until age thirty and then stopped. As a result, workers above thirty years of age earned a relatively good living, while their fellow workers below thirty were doing rath er poorly. But the reverse of the m edal was th at workers over thirtyyears old had no prospects of further wage increases, and m anagem ent policies pu t them in a hopelessly deteriorating position, while younger workers enjoyed rapidly growing wages and, in this way, were partly compensated for losses caused by piece-rate cuts.
2.
T h e style of living of the worker and his family. T his factor is closely con nected with the previous one, as the m ain source of a w orker's income is his earnings. People over thirty-years old usually had a well-balanced household budget. T hey generally had their own homes, well-furnished and mechanized. T hey had ended debts connected with building or purchasing their homes and had acquired durable goods such as tele vision sets, refrigerators, washing m a chines, and motorcycles. T o the earnings of the head of the family, the earnings of the wife were added. She also m ight have a job as their children had reached school age. W orkers below thirty years, on the o th er hand, carried the burdens of fundam ental investments connected w ith the establishm ent of family life. T hey were indebted to the savings bank for money to b u ild or buy a house and to furnish it. Moreover, as their children were small, their wives usually could not take a job. (In the differences of the economic positions of families, a dom i n an t role was played by the housing shortage in the country, which exerted a strong pressure on household budgets for several years in the worker's life.)
O n the basis of these and other eco nom ic factors, workers were divided in to two m ajor strata with divergent interests and various powers. T h e age of thirty seemed to be the economic (not demographic) dividing line.
Different Attitudes Toward Performance
W orkers above thirty years of age vigorously resisted m anagem ent's efforts to secure m axim ization of production by the work group. Instead, they were in favor of the optim ization of group out put. O ptim ization m eant t e m p o r a r y m axim ization to exploit the upw ard trend of production and wages stimu lated by m anagem ent, followed by a tem porary slowdown to avoid piece-rate cuts so as to avoid jeopardizing earnings. T h e ir objective represented a form of rational accommodation to the contra dictory features of m anagem ent's incen tive policy and also was based on con sideration of the state of their house hold budgets. Slowdowns and the ac com panying drops in earnings connected w ith optim ization were made possible by the flexible needs of these older work ers for money, by their relatively high earnings w ithin the organization, and by the sound economic position of their families.
Because workers under thirty years, on the other hand, had no alternatives to choose among, they acted almost en tirely under the economic pressure of their positions. T h e ir needs for money were inflexible as a result of their rela tively low individual earnings and the expenses of their household budgets. T hough reluctantly, they met manage m ent's dem ands to maximize work-group performance. T hey aimed their activities at extracting the most possible money from the company, regardless of the con sequences.
T h e power of the two strata of labor, clashing w ithin the framework of the group, was not equal. T h e older workers (over thirty years) had built up an ex tended inform al organization and occu pied nearly all formal positions of power in many work groups. T h e existence of their inform al organization, based on the compromise of fairly flexible indi vidual interests, originated from the m em bers' being cornered by manage m ent and, in a sense, by younger work ers as well. People under thirty years usually had less power and were subject to greater pressures from their family positions and forces w ithin the factory. T he pattern of conflicting interests and powers w ithin labor, which the m an agers tried successfully to exploit on the principle of divide et impera, had an effect also on the sharpness of the over all confrontation between employers and employees. Labor, torn by internal clashes, was unable in most cases to build efficient resistance against m anage ment, and th at m ade a considerable con tribution to the perm anence of chronic disagreement.
Patterns in Behavior of Work Groups
W ork groups showed significant dif ferences in attitudes and behavior con cerning perform ance and personal wage differentials. T hey could be classified in this respect into three types, as is done in T ab le 3.
W ork groups belonging to the three types differed in skill, length of service with the company, family status, and other socioeconomic characteristics, as indicated in T ab le 4. All included work ers in the older and younger age groups bu t in different proportions.
Type I Groups
T h e great m ajority of members of groups in T ype I were older workers (over thirty years), while younger per sons were in the m inority. T h e older workers joined together to build a pow erful inform al organization, including 70 percent of group membership. They seized all possible sources of formal power, occupying the positions of group leaders and trade union functionaries. T here were also several Com munist party members among them.
T h e inform al organization served as an agency through which members ob tained and evaluated inform ation about their environm ent. I t worked out norm a tive rules for collective activity in order to control the aspects of economic and social environm ent which were of con sequence to individual members. It func tioned as a defense, endeavoring to pro tect its members and to extract the most possible for them from their common enemy. It carried out the policy of op tim ization of work-group productivity, com bating deterioration of the economic positions of workers and keeping their wages, in comparison with their efforts, at a maxim um.
Younger workers (those below thirty years) were isolated individuals, outside the framework of the inform al organi zation. T hey were forced, by the substan tial power of the older people, to agree to optim ization of output. A lthough it did not always suit their interests be cause of their inflexible and pressing needs for money, they could perceive its advantages and worked in r e la t i v e l y peaceful coexistence with the others.
T h e members of the inform al organi zation, although a decrease in individual wage differences contradicted their im m ediate interests, set personal wage rate differentials on a m edium level (.09 in dex). In this way they m ade a concession to the younger workers to insure better cooperation w ithin the work group against m anagem ent. Groups in T ype I, due to their highly developed central ized inform al organization, were capable of counterbalancing, to a rem arkable ex tent, the power of the managem ent. Sometimes they successfully underm ined m anagem ent attem pts directed against them, other times they suffered defeats; b u t they never capitulated. As the result, they usually lived in a peaceful atmos phere in the organization. Some groups, owing to th eir extraordinary cohesive ness and to their m onopolistic position in the process of production, even m an aged to attain very high average earn ings, far above the level pegged by the company.
T ype II Groups
T h e m em bership of work groups of T ype II was m ade up of a majority of younger workers and a small m inority of older people. Inform al organization was weak and divided into opposing units, as both the older and younger workers created their own inform al bonds of solidarity to protect their interests. At the same time, the means of formal power also were divided between the two strata: both occupied group-leader, tradeunion-functionary, and Communist-party positions. O lder workers, however, as they were in a m inority and their powers proved to be weak, were forced to give up their original objectives and surren der to the m axim ization of output urged by their younger fellow workers and by m anagem ent. T h is capitulation resulted in a perm anent deterioration of their position, caused by continual piece-rate cuts. Thus, confrontation in a rather sharp form became lasting w ithin the groups in Type II.
T h e high-level individual wage dif ferentials (.13 index) can be explained on the basis of these intragroup clashes. W orkers over thirty-years old were u n willing to concede to the younger people on wage differentials, as cooperation against m anagem ent was not possible. They were fighting, in this case with considerable success, to preserve a high level of personal wage-rate differentials favorable to them. T he work groups, torn by internal struggles, could not counterbalance the power of manage ment. T h e older workers, brought to bay by their cohorts, suffered painful defeats from continual piece-rate cuts, while younger people-though somewhat com pensated by the growth of their personal wage rates-also were hurt.
Type III Groups
T h e members of work groups in Type III belonged to the strata of older work ers, whose best interests, under the cir cumstances of the company, required the optim ization of output. T his form of self-defense was made impossible, how ever, by certain factors in the physical and economic environm ent not previous ly m entioned. T h e simple preparatory operations in the u n it were perform ed by these groups, while workers in the other groups were engaged in the m ore complicated building of the railway car riage's body. T h e existence of a group incentive in Types I and II was justified by the collective n ature of work, while in the T ype III groups it was introduced to simplify adm inistration. T h e workers, only a few in num ber, perform ed their tasks separated from each other in the different corners of the shop and in shifts. T h e n ature of work and the lack of perm anent collective activities kept members from form ing the strong in formal bonds which were essential for the optim ization of output. Furtherm ore, wages per capita, on a roughly equal level in all the other groups, here were kept very low by m anagem ent as a result of the simple individual tasks. U nder the pressure of these circumstances, the only choice for the T ype III groups was the maxim ization of productivity. Over time, these workers were forced to m ake an increasing contribution to company ob jectives for nearly the same am ount of money. As a prim itive form of defense, they decreased differences in personal wage rates to a m inim um (.01 index).
T h e various types of work-group be havior in perform ance and in setting wage differentials were thus derived from the structure of interests and powers w ithin the work force (intralabor rela tions) and w ithin the company (laborm anagem ent relations), based on the whole of the socioeconomic environm ent. T h e various types of w orkgroup be havior resulted in different outcomes: some work groups m anaged to reach ex ceptionally high wages beyond any limits set by the company or by the central agencies; others fared poorly. Some work groups carried out their activities at a com fortable pace, others struggled u n der the pressure of tight piece rates.
T h e findings of this exam ination of work-group behavior and intralabor and labor-managem ent relations are sum marized in T ab le 5.
Conclusions
T h e findings of this study seem to support rather convincingly the proposi tion initially proposed: difficulties on the shop floor, including the inadequacies of the incentive system, have their basic cause in the structure of divergent in terests and various powers w ithin the company. T h e decrease in individual wage differentials carried out by labor in opposition to m anagem ent's goals, the occasional deliberate slowdown of pro duction by a significant num ber of work groups and the high m obility of m an power, all are symptoms of labor-managem ent and intralabor conflict situations and of a disequilibrium of power. In this respect, the indexes of m obility are worth noting. In T ype I work groups, where tension was relatively low due to the considerable power of the workers, only 21 percent of members left the company d uring one and one-half years. In Types II and III, where confrontation was espe cially sharp owing to the defenseless sit uation of certain strata, about 60 percent of workers gave w arning to the firm in the same period. T h e structure of powers played an especially im portant role. T h e lack of p roper division of the means of power among the participants in production produced very serious consequences. It also seemed th at not only was the di vision of power imperfect, bu t also the total am ount of power at the disposal of the organization was insufficient. T h e company seemed to be too tied by cen tral regulations to be capable of finding satisfactory solutions for its pressing problems. T h e constructive participa tion of labor scarcely can be anticipated, if m anagem ent itself does not have enough freedom in m aking vital deci sions (for example, concerning the level of wages).
As the structure of interests and pow ers is determ ined basically by the socio economic environm ent, the difficulties in the workshops can be overcome only by coordinated fundam ental modifications in the complex of m icro and m acro so cioeconomic factors. T h e prevailing be lief in H ungarian society th at problems regarding the attitude of labor can be solved by the revision of incentive plans and the introduction of fair-wage differ entials, that is, by change in a single m icroeconomic factor, is profoundly naive, as proved by the example of the com pany studied. T h e m ajor factors in fluencing the course of events within the factory are the following:
1. Macro (that is, national) measure include the regulations of the central agencies of the economy, such as the profit-sharing system, the control over wages per capita, the practice of setting prices for the internal m arket and of giving subsidies to business organiza tions, the system of credits for company investments, in brief, the decentraliza tion scheme of the centrally planned economy introduced in 1968. One also can include here regulations directly affecting labor: the central measures directed at the welfare of the population (the social insurance system, the housing program , the policy of taxation, and so forth). Rules outlining the organization and functioning of social institutions like trade unions also should be m en tioned. T h e central regulations are based on scientific analysis of the economic and social realities of the past several decades and include com plicated social, hum ani tarian, and political preferences. T h a t is why their change, although required by a num ber of negative side effects, cannot be a rapid process.
2. Micro (company) measures include m anagem ent incentive policies (the over all wage plan, the system of personal wage rates, incentives for foremen and other m iddle managers, the m ethod of piece rate setting, an d so forth), prom o tion policies, the functioning of trade union and other social organizations, the decentralization of internal decisions, the construction of institutions for la bor's participation, the existence and sta bility of inform al organization, the social composition and stratification of work ers, the effects of their out-of-factory en vironments and traditions, an d so forth.
A lthough all these micro factors are closely connected w ith the m acro ones, certain im provem ent in the solution of conflict situations can be achieved even by their revision w ithin the limits of the com pany's possibilities, if the modifica tions are based on careful consideration.
T h e following forward step, however, requires the contribution of social sci ence. M uch m ore emphasis should be placed on defining the m ain groups of participants and the conditions under which they are m otivated to participate and to produce, on the processes by which m ultiple centers of power and in fluence develop, and on conflict resolu tion as a subject which is im portant not only in labor-m anagem ent relations bu t also in most other intergroup relations w ithin the firm as well.
